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IV. 
8TATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (k) . The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about June 
6, 1994. 
V. 
IS8UES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether under the particular facts of this case not 
in dispute and as testified to by the appellee and 
his expert witness, the appellee was to some degree 
negligent? 
2. Whether the lower court's failure to require 
appellees to satisfactorily explain improper juror 
conduct warrants a new trial? 
3. Whether appellee's counsel's appeal to sympathy in 
his opening argument and subsequent questioning, 
warrant a new trial? 
4. Whether the lower court erred in not granting a 
directed verdict and in not granting a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative a 
new trial? 
1 
Issues Nos. 1 and 4 are reviewed under a substantial 
evidence standard. The appellate court views all evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. The verdict will be reversed 
if there is insufficient evidence to support it. E.g.. Crookston 
v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991); Kilpack v. 
Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1979). However, the reviewing 
court may reassess a witness1 credibility when, as in this case, 
some testimony was inherently improbable. State v. Workman. 852 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). 
Issue No. 2 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard, but when improper juror contact occurs, it is presumed 
prejudicial. State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah App. 1992). 
Issue No. 3 is reviewed de novo. A ruling court will 
reverse if the court concludes that the argument was improper and 
prejudicial. See also. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co. . 781 P.2d 
445, 400 (Utah App. 1989). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The determinative statues and rules are Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-6-46(1) and 41-6-80. The determinative rules are Rule 59(a)(1), 
(2), (6) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Copies are 
attached in the Addendum. 
2 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the 
Lower Court, 
Andrew Berry as the guardian of a 4%-year-old child, 
Reynold Johnson (hereinafter "Johnson" or "the Johnson child"), 
sued Michael K. Coons ("Coons") for negligence as a result of a 
collision between Coons in a van and trailer and Johnson on a small 
bicycle (R. 1-4). Coons testified that as he travelled north he 
saw Johnson on the west side of the road. He did not slow down, 
and he took his eyes off of Johnson for two to three seconds so 
that he did not see the child crossing the road until it was too 
late to avoid impact, A divided (6-2) Sanpete County jury found 
that Coons was not negligent (R. 213). Johnsonfs Motion for a 
Directed Verdict and Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict Or in the Alternative a New Trial (R. 229-252), were all 
denied by the lower court (R. 327-328). Johnson timely filed a 
Notice of Appeal on January 25, 1994 (R. 323-326) . The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
on June 6, 1994. 
B. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for 
Review. 
This case is the result of an auto/pedestrian accident 
that occurred on Manti's Main Street, just sourth of 4th North, on 
3 
October 27, 1989 around 6:00 p.m. (R. 1-4); Transcript of 
Proceedings, August 4-6, 1993, Vol. I, p. 123, Ins. 17-25; 154; 
176, hereinafter MTr. Vol. I, p. ") . At the time of the 
accident, there was plenty of light, visibility was excellent, and 
the road was dry (Tr. Vol. I, p. 200, Ins. 19-20; p. 201, Ins. 2-4, 
19-20). 
Reynold Johnson, a 4%-year-old child, lived on Main 
Street near 4th North. On the day of the accident, he was across 
the street playing with some friends. Michael Coons was driving 
his van, traveling north on Main Street. His cruise control was 
set for 30 m.p.h. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 190-191, 133-134, 137, 158-159, 
200; Tr. Ex. 34). 
At trial, Coons admitted that he saw Johnson and his 
playmates: 
Mr. Coons: A: [I] didn't just observe -
- observe him . . . . 
There were a couple of 
kids with him on the west 
side . . . . [T]here were 
also some kids running 
around on the . . . east 
side. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 201, Ins. 24-25). 
Coons admitted that he is "not good at distances," so he 
had difficulty in estimating how far away he was from the children 
when he first saw them (Tr. Vol. I, p. 202, Ins. 14-25). When his 
published deposition was taken, he testified that he was a half 
4 
block away, and made a drawing showing his location (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 204, Ins. 3-24). The drawing was trial Exhibit 31. A Manti 
city block is 482 feet (Tr. Vol. II, p. 489, Ins. 16-20), so Coons 
was approximately 241 feet away. In contrast, Coons testified at 
trial that he may have been 100 feet away when he first saw the 
child and only 25 feet away when he saw him crossing the street 
(Tr. p. 203, Ins. 2-11; p. 224, Ins. 2-7). In so testifying, Coons 
was mistaken. Coons' accident reconstructionist did not believe 
Coons• testimony: 
Mr. Wells: 
Mr. Knight: 
Q: Do you believe it's 
accurate when he says 25 
feet south of the 
intersection? 
A: No. 
* * * 
A: No. We went through that 
before. Because at 25 
feet, when he's 25 feet 
away, you see that the 
speed of the boy, has to 
be too great for them to 
close, and we agreed to 
that before. But he 
says, "I see the boy 
coming" and his 
description of 25 feet is 
probably in error." 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 487, Ins. 8-16.) 
5 
Johnson1 s accident reconstruction expert also disbelieved 
that Coons was only 25 feet away from Johnson when Coons first saw 
the child in the road. 
Mr. Wells: Q: So do you have an opinion 
as to whether or not the 
testimony of Mr. Coons 
that he was 25 feet south 
at the intersection when 
he saw Ren at point — 
some point off at 10:00 
o'clock in time? 
Mr. Beaufort: A: I do. 
Q: And what is that opinion? 
A: Itfs not true.1 
(Tr. p. 282, Ins. 10-16.) 
The reason Coons was mistaken and the accident 
reconstructionists did not believe him was because it was 
physically impossible to have a collision if Coons first saw the 
boy in the road near the point of impact. Main Street is 62% feet 
wide (Tr. Ex. 36). The collision occurred when the child rode his 
bicycle east across Main Street and collided with the trailer 
pulled by Coons (Tr. Exs. 22, 23, 24, 33; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 179-180). 
Both sides' accident reconstructionists determined that the point 
of impact was 55 feet east of the west curb. 
*The witness subsequently demonstrated to the jury how it was 
physically impossible for Coons to first see the child in the road 
25 feet away and have a collision (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 279-282). 
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A: The distance is 55 feet . 
to the point of 
impact. 
* * * 
Q: So you agree with Mr. 
Beaufort? Fifty-five 
feet over to the point of 
impact? 
A: Yes. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 285, Ins. 2-10; p. 402, Ins. 11-14.) 
Using a bicycle virtually identical to Johnson's 
bicycle2, and a 4%-year-old child going as fast as he could, 
Johnson's accident reconstructionist determined that it took a 
minimum of 6.1 to 7.8 seconds for Johnson to reach the point of 
impact. In other words, Johnson's maximum speed was 10.7 feet per 
second, and probably 7 to 9 feet per second (Tr. Vol. II, p. 268, 
Ins. 16-25; p. 269; p. 270; p. 273, Ins. 5-24; p. 285). One of 
Coons' accident reconstructionists agreed that Johnson's speed was 
7.7 to 10.7 feet per second. 
Mr. Knight: A: The second and third opinions that I 
had was that if the bike is going 
from 7.7 to 10.7 feet per second, 
that gave me a relative speed of the 
bike, and that's what Mr. Beaufort 
testified to. 
2The only difference in the bike that was tested and Johnson's 
bike was that Johnson's bike had an 11-inch wheel, whereas the 
tested bike had a 12-inch wheel. Beaufort made the mathematical 
adjustments before calculating the distance and speed traveled by 
Johnson (Tr. p. 269, Ins. 3-11). 
Mr. Beaufort: 
Mr. Sorenson: 
7 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 460, Ins. 4-5.) 
Coons' other accident reconstructionist demonstrated that 
an older boy (6 years old) on a bigger bike (16-inch wheels) could 
go 9 to 14 feet per second (Tr. pp. 372, 373, 377, 395, 399). 
However, on cross-examination, he admitted that Johnson's expert's 
data was more reliable and more precise because he used a 12-inch 
wheel bicycle and a 4%-year-old child to run the test. 
Mr. Wells: Q: And don't you believe that using a 4%-
year-old on a near identical bike would 
produce more reliable data than using a 
6-year-old on a bigger bike? 
Mr. Sorenson: A: It would be more reliable. I still feel 
that my data is quite reliable . . . . 
It's very close to Mr. Beaufort's. 
* * * 
Q: True, the data using the actual 
equivalent bike is more reliable. 
A: It would be more precise. But it's still 
within a range of my data. 
Q: I understand. He's talked about ranges. 
But it is more precise? 
A: Yes. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 399, Ins. 17-25; p. 400, Ins. 1-10.) 
Newell Knight, Coon's other expert, explained that the 
only evidence of Coons' speed was Coons' testimony that he set his 
speed control at 30 m.p.h. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 455). At 30 m.p.h., 
Coons was going 45 feet per second (Tr. Vol. II, p. 489, Ins. 11-
8 
12). Since it took the Johnson child a minimum of 6.1 to 7.8 
seconds to reach the point of impact (Tr. p. 285) , Coons had to be 
at least 274-351 feet away when he first saw the children playing 
near the side of the road (45 feet x 6.1 to 7.8). Again, Coons1 
accident reconstructionist concluded that Coons was at least 207 
feet away when he saw the children. 
Q: [I]f he [Coons] went 30 [m.p.h.] that 
whole time, he'd be down somewhere close 
to the middle of the block when Ren 
[Johnson] was out there; isnft that 
correct? 
A: 207 feet away it says. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 489, Ins. 20-25.) 
In summary, any disciplined review of the evidence and 
testimony shows that when Coons first observed the Johnson child 
and his playmates, Coons was approximately a half block away or 
more than 200 feet. 
When Coons observed the children on the side of the road, 
he was well aware that children do unexpected things. 
Mr. Wells: Q: Have you ever seen kids 
do something unexpected?3 
Mr. Coons: A: Sir, we've all, as children, done 
things unexpected. 
Q: So don't you think it 
would be prudent when 
3Every expert witness who also testified said that children do 
unexpected things and that drivers should proceed with caution. 
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you're driving along and 
you see kids along the 
road, to keep your 
attention on them until 
you are past them? 
A: I sure do. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 244, Ins. 2-8.) 
Nevertheless, Coons did not keep his eyes on the 
children. 
Q: You then proceeded to run a mirror check, 
didn't you? 
A: I do that constantly . . . . I do that 
all the time (Tr. Vol. I, p. 205, Ins. 9-
14). 
* * * 
Q: How much time do you think you spent 
clearing your mirrors . . . more than one 
second? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: More than two seconds? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: More than three seconds? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Somewhere between two and three seconds 
A: Yes, sir. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 222, Ins. 9-25; p. 223, Ins. 1-7)? 
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As a result of taking his eyes off of the children for 
two to three seconds, Coons did not see the Johnson child begin to 
travel east across the road on his little bike. 
Q: [Y]ou did not see him [Johnson] start up, 
did you? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: You didn't see him cross the plane of the 
west side of Main Street, did you? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: And you didn't see him come across until 
he got to Point D [one-third of the way 
across the street], did you? 
A: No, sir, I didn't. 
* * * 
Q: [A] 11 I'm trying to establish is that I 
want you to admit that whatever period of 
time it took him [Johnson] to get from 
stop at Point B [west of Main Street] to 
whatever period of time it took for him 
to go from stop to Point B to however 
fast he was going at D [one-third of the 
way across the street] — . 
A: Yes. 
Q: You weren't looking ahead to where you 
could see what he was doing? 
A: No, sir, I wasn't. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 219, Ins. 2-15; p. 229, In. 25; p. 230, Ins. 1-6). 
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Coons also admitted that had he paid attention to the 
children so as to see the child start to cross the street, he could 
have avoided the accident. 
Q: Do you believe if you had seen Ren 
[Johnson] sooner you could have avoided 
the accident? 
A: Only if I had been able to see him [the 
Johnson child] as he started to go. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 240, Ins. 18-21). 
Not only did Coons fail to pay attention to the children, 
he did not slow down when he first observed them. 
Q: Now you were on cruise control up to the 
time that you slammed your brakes or put 
your brakes on. Isn't that correct? 
A: Yes, sir. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 235, Ins. 2-5). 
Q: Do you still think that you'd have time 
to stop if you slowed down or stopped 
back here about A [where he first saw 
Johnson]? 
A: Instead of going the speed limit? I was 
going five miles under the speed limit. 
I'd slowed down to 25, if I'd known he 
was going across, if I'd known he was 
going to cross the road, maybe I wouldn't 
even been on the road. 
Q: Do you think it might have been prudent 
to take it off the cruise control? 
A: No, sir. 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 242, 243, Ins. 4-6). 
12 
As Coons was heading north on Main Street at 30 m.p.h.# 
Johnson started to cross the street on his bicycle. Coons didn't 
see him until just before impact (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 136, Ins. 2-7). 
Coons swerved to the right, honked his horn, and lightly applied 
his brakes.4 Johnson tried to stop his bicycle, but collided with 
the trailer pulled by Coons (Tr. Vol. I, p. 134, Ins. 19-25; p. 
139, Ins. 4-22; Tr. Exs. 22-24, 33, 34, 36). Both Johnson's and 
Coons' experts concluded at trial that if Coons had slowed down or 
kept his attention on the children, the accident could have been 
avoided because it took Johnson 6.1 to 7.8 seconds to cross the 
road, and Coons only needed 3.8 to 4 seconds to stop (Tr. Vol. II, 
pp. 285-288, 490-493). 
As a direct result of the collision, Johnson suffered 
extensive injuries. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that 
Coons1 insurance company would pay $100,000, the policy limits, if 
the jury found that Coons was in the least degree (1% or more) 
negligent (R. 60-62, a copy of which is attached in the Addendum). 
The Court instructed the jury that damages were not an issue, and 
told them that the jury only had to decide whether Coons was 
negligent: 
4Coons did not leave any skid marks and his brakes did not 
disturb the leaves and dirt on the road. 
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In this case, you're only gonna be called on 
to determine the first question: Was anybody 
at fault? Was anybody negligent? 
The other part of the question — how much 
should you pay? — has already been solved and 
you're not gonna be called on to solve that 
part of the disagreement in this case. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, In. 25; p. 19, Ins. 1-6). 
* * * 
In this case, the parties have reached an 
agreement called a stipulation, regarding the 
amount of damages suffered by Reynold Johnson 
as a result of the collision on October 27, 
1989. Since the amount of damages has been 
agreed to by the parties, the issue of 
damages, which is usually for the jury to 
decide, will not be presented to you for 
decision. 
(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 524, Ins. 16-22.) 
The Court also instructed the jury that Johnson, because 
of his young age, was not negligent. Although it is uncontested 
that Coons did not keep his attention on the children or slow down, 
and that the accident was avoidable, the jury returned a verdict 
that Coons was not negligent (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 529, Ins. 16-17). 
A possible reason for the verdict is that jurors may have been 
sympathetic to Coons and his disabilities. In his opening 
statement, Coons' counsel improperly told the jury: 
You may have observed Mike Coons has been here 
in the courtroom today, but he doesn't look 
too good today. He didn't sleep last night. 
He went to the hospital at 5:00 this morning 
and got a shot of Demerol. He is in pain and 
14 
this stems from a parachute accident he had 
when he was on active duty in the . . . . 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 114, Ins. 21-25; p. 115, In. 1). 
Johnson's counsel then objected to the improper argument 
as a ploy for sympathy (Tr. Vol. I, p. 115, Ins. 2-3) . But the 
Court overruled the objection (Tr. p. 115, In. 9) . Coons' counsel 
continued with his plea for sympathy: 
He had a parachute accident in 1983 when he 
was on active duty in Ft. Bragg in the 82nd 
Airborne Division. He was severely injured. 
He had 13 surgeries and he does have a lot of 
pain. 
In October of 1989, he was feeling fairly well 
and it should have been a happy day for him. 
(Tr. p. 115, Ins. 12-18.) 
During the trial, Coons' counsel continued with his plea 
for sympathy by obtaining the following testimony: 
Mr. Henderson Q: 
Mr. Coons: A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
You were with the 82nd Airborne Division? 
Yes, sir. I was an infantry captain. 
Can you tell me how many operations 
you've had on your body? 
13. 
Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen 
of the jury what happens to you when your 
— what did you call them? Your — ? 
The post-traumatic. 
No, your maintenance after a couple of 
having you said stated to what — the 
Court? 
15 
A: The word he used was disability. 
Q: Your disability, yeah? 
A: My mind clouds. I stutter. I can't 
connect thoughts together to be able to 
be expressive. I have a master's degree 
in business, but it hasn't done me much 
good since the [parachute] accident. 
(Tr. p. 247, Ins. 10-25; p. 248, Ins. 1-3.) 
The final error that occurred at trial was that Coons had 
improper contact with the jury. Specifically, twice during the 
trial, Coons spoke with the jury members, shook their hands, and 
conversed about mutual friends (R. 223-228, 253-258). 
Johnson timely moved for a directed verdict, and after 
trial a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Or in the Alternative 
a New Trial (R. 229-252). After the Court denied all post-trial 
motions, Johnson timely appealed on January 25, 1994. 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Any Disciplined Review of the Undisputed Evidence 
Shows That Reasonable Minds Must Conclude 
That Coons Was Negligent. 
Coons' appeal rests on these undisputed facts: (1) when 
Coons first saw the children, more than 200 feet away, Coons had a 
duty to slow down, but he did not; (2) Coons had a duty to look out 
for the children from the time he first saw them to the time of 
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impact, but he did not look out for the Johnson child; and (3) had 
Coons looked out for the child, he could easily have avoided the 
accident. As set forth in Point I of the Argument section of this 
Brief, since Coons unquestionably breached his duty to slow down 
and his duty to look out for the children, reasonable minds can 
only conclude that Coons was negligent. 
POINT II 
Improper Argument, Sympathetic Testimony, 
and Improper Contact With the Jury 
Warrant a New Trial. 
Over the objections of Johnson's counsel, Coons' counsel 
told the jury in his opening argument that while serving in the 
82nd Airborne Division, Coons suffered a parachute accident and has 
undergone 13 operations. The opening argument was reinforced by 
Coons' testimony. The foregoing was clearly an improper plea for 
sympathy. The parachute accident had absolutely nothing to do with 
the accident at issue. Moreover, it was prejudicial. The plea for 
sympathy coupled with the jury's disregard for Coons' admissions of 
negligence unquestionably show that the plea for sympathy worked. 
In addition, twice during the trial, Coons approached and 
engaged members of the jury in conversations about mutual friends 
(R. 223-228). The improper conduct is presumed prejudicial. E.g.. 
State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah 1992). Moreover, since 
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the Court refused to require Coons to explain his contact with the 
jury, the presumption of prejudice was not rebutted. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Any Disciplined Review of the Undisputed Evidence 
Shows That Reasonable Minds Must Conclude 
That Coons Was Negligent. 
A. Introduction. 
The Johnson child's appeal that reasonable minds must 
conclude that Coons was, to some degree, negligent is based on two 
simple premises. First, once Coons observed the children on the 
side of the road, he had a duty to slow down and a duty to look out 
for them. Second, there is no dispute that Coons breached these 
two duties. He did not slow down, and he did not look out for the 
Johnson child. Because reasonable minds cannot differ on the 
negligence issue, the judgment must be reversed and the case 
remanded for entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with such a judgment. See 
Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 466 (Utah 1979). 
B. Coons Had A Duty to Slow Down, and a Duty to Look Out For the 
Johnson Child. 
1. The Duty to Slow Down 
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection 
of another's safety, such care, precaution and vigilance as the 
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circumstances justly demand. Downey v. Gemini Mining Co.. 68 P.2d 
414 (Utah 1902) . More specifically, negligence is the breach of a 
duty to use due care under the circumstances. E.g.
 f Wheeler v. 
Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 397, 431 P.2d 985 (1967). Whether a duty 
exists is a question of law. E.g. , C.T. v. Martinez, 845 P. 2d 246, 
247 (Utah 1992); Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778 (Utah 
1992) . Moreover, because this case involves an injury to a child, 
any duty imposed by the law to protect the child is enhanced or 
increased. Wheeler, supra at 397. The reason the law requires a 
greater protection of children was explained in Kilpack, supra at 
464: 
[I]t is necessary to exercise greater caution 
for the protection and safety of a young child 
than for an adult person. One dealing with 
children must anticipate the ordinary behavior 
of children. The fact that they usually 
cannot and do not exercise the same degree of 
prudence for their own safety as adults, they 
often are thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a 
duty to exercise a degree of vigilance and 
caution commensurate with such circumstances 
in dealing with children. 
In Utah, the law imposes upon a driver a duty of due care 
to all other persons on or near the highway. Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661, 672 n. 15, 673 (Utah 1984). The driver must operate his 
vehicle to avoid danger to himself and others. Kilpack, supra at 
464. The duty to avoid danger includes a duty to slow down so that 
the driver can avoid impact with children who are present. See Fay 
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v, Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, 644 P.2d 68, 70 (Colo. App. 1981) 
(when a motorist cannot stop or turn aside in time to avoid a 
collision with an object in his range of vision, he is negligent); 
c,f,. Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 83, 395 P.2d 918 
(1964) (when there is a hazard which is plainly visible, the 
individual is charged with a duty to heed what he saw and avoid 
it). The duty to reduce speed is codified in Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-6-80 and 41-6-46(1) (copies attached in the Addendum) which 
read, in part, as follows: 
The operator of a vehicle shall exercise care 
to avoid colliding with any pedestrian . . . . 
* * * 
A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under 
the existing conditions, giving regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then existing, 
including when: . . . (e) special hazards 
exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, 
weather or highway conditions. 
2. The Duty to Look Out For the Johnson Child 
Coons also had "a duty to maintain a reasonable, proper 
and adequate look-out and to recurrently re-observe and re-appraise 
the situation. Failure to do so is negligence." Anderson v. 
Bradley. 590 P.2d 329, 342 (Utah 1979); Badger v. Clavson, 18 Utah 
2d 329, 422 P.2d 665 (1967). 
A motorist has a duty to look not only straight ahead but 
laterally ahead as well, and to see that which is in plain sight. 
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Further, Coons is presumed to see what he could see by looking, and 
he is not permitted to escape negligence by saying that he did not 
see that which was in plain view. E.g., Nissen v. Johnson. 339 
P.2d 651, 653 (Mont. 1959). Further, when children are involved, 
the duty to look out for their safety is increased. Kilpack, supra 
at 464. 
C. Coons Did Not Slow Down, and He Did Not Look Out for the 
Johnson Child. 
Coons' own testimony establishes, without question, that 
when he saw the children 200-300 feet away playing on the side of 
the road, he did not slow down. 
Mr. Wells: Q: Now you were on cruise control up to 
the time that you slammed your 
brakes on - put your brakes on; 
isn't that correct? 
Mr. Coons: A: Yes, sir. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 235, Ins. 2-5). 
Mr. Wells: Q: Do you think it may have been 
prudent to take off the cruise 
control? 
Mr. Coons: A: No, sir. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 245, Ins. 4-6). 
It is impossible to marshall any evidence that Coons did 
slow down when he first saw the children, because there isn't any.5 
5The question of negligence becomes a question of law when the 
whole question turns on Coons' own statements about his conduct, 
which conduct is negligence. In view of his statements, but one 
21 
There is no evidence of speed contrary to Coons1 testimony. His 
own expert, Newell Knight so explained at trial, 
Mr. Henderson: Q: 
Mr. Knight: 
Mr. Henderson: 
Mr. Knight: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Now based on your training, your 
work experience, your education, and 
all that you have reviewed to 
prepare yourself to testify here at 
trial, have you formed some opinions 
that relate to this case? 
I have. 
Would you tell us what they are? 
The first opinion is that there is 
no objective evidence to tell us 
what the speed of the vehicle was, 
the Coons vehicle. Objective means 
there's no skid marks. We know 
there were no skid marks on the 
road. The best evidence we have is 
what Mr. Coons says, "I was 
traveling at 30 because I've got my 
cruise on that. I'm going at 3 0." 
So the first opinion was that we're 
bound to accept 30 m.p.h. because we 
don't have objective data. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 455, Ins. 4-18; p. 456, Ins. 5-13). 
Thus, there is no factual question at all that Coons did 
not slow down when he first saw the children 200-3 00 feet away, and 
he proceeded at 30 m.p.h. on cruise control. 
conclusion is permissible, and that is that his conduct was 
negligence as a matter of law. See Taylor v. Bamberger Electric R. 
Co., 220 P. 695, 700 (Utah 1923). 
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That Coons did not continue to look out for the Johnson 
child after he first saw the children is also established by Coons1 
own testimony. Coons testified that on the day of the accident, it 
was light (Tr. Vol. I, p. 201, Ins. 3-4), and that visibility was 
good (Tr. Vol. I, p. 200, In. 20) . Coons said he could see two 
blocks ahead (Tr. Vol. I, p. 201, In. 20). At first, Coons tried 
to tell the jury that while checking his mirrors, he also kept his 
eye on the children. 
Mr. Wells: Q: But you weren't looking directly 
ahead at the time, were you? 
Mr. Coons: A: That is not a fair thing to say 
because yes, I was watching forward 
and staying in the same lane. But 
at the same time, I always glance at 
my mirrors. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 205, Ins. 3-19). 
But on further examination, Coons admitted that he took 
his eyes off of the children for two to three seconds to check his 
mirrors, and as a result, he did not see the Johnson child start to 
cross the road (Tr. Vol. I, p. 233, Ins. 1-4; p. 224, Ins. 1-8; p. 
229, In. 25; p. 230, Ins. 1-9). He further admitted that had he 
seen the Johnson child starting to cross the street, he could have 
avoided the accident. 
Mr. Wells: Q: Do you believe if you had seen Ren 
[Johnson] sooner you could have 
avoided the accident? 
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Mr. Coons: A: Only if I'd been able to see him as 
he started to go.6 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 240, Ins. 18-22.) 
Again, it is impossible to marshall evidence contrary to 
Coons' own testimony because there isn't any. No one else knows 
how long Coons was distracted other than Coons himself. Moreover, 
what physical evidence does exist supports Coons' testimony that he 
was distracted. Specifically, the lack of skid marks justifies an 
inference against any quick action to avoid the accident. Morbv v. 
Rogers. 202 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1953). 
In summary, reasonable minds must conclude that based on 
Coons' testimony, Coons took his eyes off of the children for two 
to three seconds, and as a result, he was unable to avoid the 
collision with the Johnson child. 
D. Because There is No Factual Dispute That Coons Breached His 
Duty to Slow Down and His Duty to Look Out For the Johnson 
Child, the Judgment Must Be Reversed and the Judgment N.O.V. 
Granted. 
The issue of negligence or breach of a legal duty is 
normally a question of fact for the jury, but it becomes a question 
of law when the undisputed facts permit only one reasonable 
6Coons' conclusion that had he seen the child as he started to 
cross the street is supported by the fact that two vehicles 
traveling southbound (vehicles closer to the child than Coons) were 
able to stop their cars in time to avoid injury (Tr. vol. I, p. 
241, Ins. 1-13). 
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conclusion. Marquez v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 838 P.2d 660, 662 
(Utah 1992); Kilpack, supra. 
The facts in this case are essentially identical to the 
facts in Holmes v. Nelson 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 (1958). The 
Nelson court stated the facts as follows: 
[T]he accident occurred about 8:20 pm. on 800 
West Street in Woods Cross, which street runs 
north and south in front of and east of the 
home of plaintiff's parents. The oiled 
surface of the highway is approximately 38 
feet 6 inches wide. The shoulders on each 
side are approximately 10 to 12 feet wide. 
The west lane of traffic of said oiled highway 
is 22 feet 5 inches wide, and the east lane of 
traffic is 16 feet 3 inches wide. The point 
of impact was approximately 4 feet 6 inches 
into the east lane of traffic. The speed 
limit was 30 miles per hour. Defendant was 
travelling northerly with his wife at a speed 
of 25 m.p.h. with his headlights on. 
(Defendant's wife warned him when 300 feet 
from the point of impact of the presence of 
children.) Defendant saw the children himself 
when he was 200 feet south of where the child 
was struck. A car approached from the north 
and defendant observed the children move back 
to permit the southbound car to pass. 
Defendant's car and the southbound car passed 
at a point about 100 to 125 feet south of the 
point of impact. 
Defendant testified that when he observed the 
children about 200 feet to the north he 
removed his foot from the gas pedal; that he 
did not then apply the brakes and that the 
removal of foot from the gas pedal did not 
appreciably slow him down because of a slight 
decline toward the north. Defendant testified 
that he did nothing except remove his foot 
from the accelerator to safeguard the children 
until he saw plaintiff dart into the street 
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when defendant was about 75 feet from the 
point of impact. He did not slow down any, 
and did not put his foot onto the brake pedal 
to enable him to stop more quickly. Defendant 
did not remember if he sounded his horn. 
7 Utah 2d at 436-37. 
As in this case, the Nelson jury found the defendant 
driver was not negligent. The Nelson plaintiff filed a motion 
under Rule 59 for a new trial. The Nelson trial court correctly 
granted the motion and properly held that the verdict was against 
the preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court granted an 
interlocutory appeal and upheld the trial court. The Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that the accident was avoidable and that the trial 
court was right to grant a new trial. The similarities in the 
evidence between the accident in Nelson and the accident in this 
case are striking. Also, the failures of the driver in Nelson and 
of Coon in this case are nearly identical. Some of the 
similarities and failures are as follows: 
NELSON COONS 
1. Accident on paved street 1. Accident on paved highway 
in front of parent's in front of parent's 
home• home• 
2. Impact in east lanes of 2. Impact on east side of 
roadway. roadway. 
3. Nelson travelling 25 3. Coons travelling 30 
m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. m.p.h. in 35 m.p.h. 
zone — 5 m.p.h. below zone — 5 m.p.h. below 
speed limit. speed limit. 
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4. Nelson was aware of 
children 200-300 feet 
from point of impact. 
5. Nelson removed foot 
from gas when he saw the 
children. 
6. Nelson did not slow 
down as he approached 
children. 
7. Three and one-half (3%) 
year old child ran into 
street from west side of 
street. 
8. Nelson saw the boy enter 
the street and immediately 
braked. 
9. Nelson testified he 
observed the children at 
such a distance that he 
was able to take 
reasonable precautions. 
10. No action to stop the 
vehicle or to slow it 
down was taken until the 
child darted into the 
street. 
11. Nelson left 52.5 feet 
of skid marks. 
4. Coons saw children 
200-300 feet from point of 
impact. 
5. Coons maintained 
speed on cruise control 
when he saw children. 
6. Coons did not slow 
down as he approached 
children. 
7. Four and one-half (4%) 
year old boy rode bike 
into street from west 
side of street. 
8. Coons does not see child 
until almost one-third 
(1/3) way across the 
street. 
9. Coons testified he 
could have avoided the 
accident if he had seen 
the child enter the 
street. 
10. No action to avoid the 
accident was taken until 
the driver looked up and 
saw the boy over one-
quarter (1/4) of the way 
across the street. 
11. Coons left no skid 
marks. 
Given the near identity of the facts between Nelson and 
this case, it is clear that reasonable minds in the present case 
simply cannot say that Coons was not to some degree negligent. 
Coons' negligence is also unquestionably established by his 
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admitted violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-80 and 41-6-46(1). 
Violations of a traffic law enacted for the safety of a class of 
persons to which plaintiff belongs is prima facie evidence of 
negligence. Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130, 1135 (Utah 1990). 
In summary, the standards set forth in Kilpack v. 
Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah 1979), and the cases cited on 
pages 18-21 of this Brief, create a duty to look for the impulsive 
behavior of children. Coons' failure to do so by slowing as he 
approached the children and his failure to keep a constant look-out 
for impulsive child behavior, coupled with his admission that had 
he done so, the accident could have been avoided, require a 
reversal of the Judgment and either the entry of the* Judgment 
n.o.v. or a new trial. 
POINT II 
Improper Argument, Sympathetic Testimony, 
and Improper Contact With the Jury 
Warrant a New Trial. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
Coons1 opening statement told the jury that he didn't 
feel well because he suffered a parachute accident while serving 
with the 82nd Airborne Division. See pages 14-15 of this Brief, 
Statement of the Facts section. The jury was also told that Coons 
was an ex-infantry captain, and then while serving his Country, he 
was injured and had subsequently suffered 13 operations. As a 
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result, he was disabled. Even the trial judge was sympathetic to 
Coons' plight. For that reason, instead of placing Coons under 
oath, the trial judge was "willing to just ask him [whether Coons 
would tell the truth] rather than have him make any magic signs or 
anything" (Tr. Vol. I, p. 198, Ins. 13-14). In addition, on the 
first day of the trial and on the last day of the trial, Coons 
approached two members of the jury, shook hands, and discussed the 
activities of mutual friends (R. 221-228). The Court declined to 
require Coons to explain his improper conduct (R. 291-293, 327-
328). A split jury (6-2) subsequently found Coons not negligent, 
even though he failed to pay attention to the children and to slow 
down. Coons1 counsel objected to the improper argument and counsel 
moved for a new trial when he learned of the improper contact. The 
objection was overruled and a new trial was denied (R. 327-328). 
B. Legal Analysis 
1. The Improper Argument Warrants a New Trial. 
The trial court has the obligation of controlling the 
arguments presented to the jury. Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 
411, 414-415, 360 P.2d 822 (1961). Arguments appealing to sympathy 
and passion cannot be allowed by the courts. E.g., Eager v. 
Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 320, 410 P.2d 1003 (1966). 
2. Improper Juror Contact Warrants a New Trial. 
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Any contact between a juror and witness, party or court 
personnel that is more than a brief and incidental contact raises 
a presumption of prejudice because of the effect of breeding a 
sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the juror's judgment 
or credibility. State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279-281 (Utah 1985). 
Specifically, a discussion between an officer and a juror telling 
about a patio cleaning accident required a new trial. Id. 
Similarly, a short discussion between a complaining witness and a 
juror led to a mistrial. State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah App. 
1992). Absent a satisfactory explanation, Utah and other courts 
presume the contact is prejudicial. As explained in California 
Fruit Exchange v. Henry, 89 F.Supp. 580, 588 (W.D. Pa. 1950) aff'd 
184 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1951), the Court stated: 
[T]he courts look with suspicion upon any 
communications between parties to a suit or 
their counsel and the jury empaneled to try 
it; and if such communication is had and it 
appears a conversation was had about the suit, 
or the communication is not explained 
satisfactorily, it will, in itself, be grounds 
for a new trial. 
The affidavits on file clearly show an attempt to 
ingratiate defendant with the juror and create an improper rapport. 
Throughout the trial, defendant acted to elicit sympathy for 
himself because of his "military injuries." When coupled with the 
improper contact shown by the affidavits, it is clear that these 
contacts induced six of the eight jurors to reach a verdict for 
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defendant which, as shown in Point I of this Brief, is contrary to 
the evidence. 
3. The Improper Argument and Juror Contact Warrant a New 
Trial. 
When argument brings prejudicial matter before the jury, 
it is reversible error unless it can be affirmatively ascertained 
from the record that no harm resulted. E.g. . Roberts v. Lewis, 441 
P.2d 350 (Okl. 1968); c.f., Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 
445 (Utah App. 1989) (improper argument negated by court's 
admonishment to disregard statements). However, in this case, the 
record demonstrates that harm occurred. For example, the Court 
overruled Johnson's objection to the improper argument and did not 
give a corrective admonishment. Great weight is given to the 
presence or absence of objections and corrections. Ostler, supra; 
Tetuan v. A. H. Robins Co. , 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987). Second, the 
jury's failure to find any negligence at all on the part of Coons, 
despite his admissions, to the contrary shows that the jury was 
sympathetic to Coons. 
Similarly, the lower court's failure to require Coons to 
explain his improper contact with the jurors also demonstrates the 
Court's sympathy toward Coons and is a failure to remove the 
contact's prejudicial effect. State v. Pike, supra; California 
Fruit Exchange, supra. 
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X. 
CONCLUSION 
Coons' testimony and all of the evidence viewed in a 
light favorable to the verdict conclusively show that reasonable 
minds must conclude that Coons was negligent. He did not slow down 
and he did not look out for the Johnson child. Further, Coons1 
improper contact with the jurors and his plea for sympathy in his 
opening argument require a reversal of the Judgment and either a 
judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. ^ 
Respectfully submitted this .; L/ day of December, 1994. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
-> /I 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Determinative Statutes and Rules 
2. Judgment on Special Verdict 
3. Order on Motion for a New Trial 
4. Affidavits Showing Improper Juror Contact 
5. Stipulation 
6. Coons1 Drawing of the Accident (Tr. Ex. 31; Depo. Ex. 1) 
Tabl 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds 
at certain locations — Prima facie speed limits — 
Rulemaking — Emergency power of the gover-
nor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or 
highway conditions. 
41-6-80. Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid pedestrians 
— Audible signals and caution. 
The operator of a vehicle shall exercise care to avoid colliding with any 
pedestrian and shall give an audible signal when necessary and exercise ap-
propriate precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused, 
incapacitated, or intoxicated person. This section supersedes any conflicting 
provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
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10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor C!.Lf!X 
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Telephones (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
VB. 
Civil NO. 0920600128 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Judge David Mower 
Defendant. 
This case having come on regularly for jury trial on August 
4, 5, and 6, 1993, and the jury having answered the Special 
Verdict: 
l. Was the defendant Michael K. Coons negligent? 
Yes 
No X 
NOW, THEREFORE, based thereon, it is hereby ORDKRKD, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: Judgment be, and hereby is entered 
in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, no cause of action, 
and that defendant be, and hereby ie awarded costs in the amount 
of $ qOo ^ 
DATED thin 2 7 rti»y f>f August, 1993-
^ omss >M 
• - * • < • > : , 
\C 
ASSOCIATES 
7 
Edward T# Walla 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
BY THE COURT 
DAVUI..MOWBR 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
•*2~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Chrietonsen & Martineau, attorneys 
for defendant herein; that eh© served the attached Proposed 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT (Case Number 0920600128, Sixth 
Judicial DiatHnfc court in and for Sanpete county) upon the 
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRV & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64X07 _ 
and causing the same to be hand-delivered on the j ^ day ot 
August, 1993• 
7tl 
/ 
L '^t ^UL Donna Campbell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ j ^ ' day of August, 
1993. 
f
 in the Statte bf tofcah 
My Commission Expires: 
1-SH^H 
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Tab 3 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SANPETE COUNTY 
160 North Main, Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone (801) 835-2131 Facsimile (801) 835-2121 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL 
Case number 920600128 
Judge DAVID L. MOWER 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial is denied. The motion 
was based on alleged iaproper contacts between defendant and some 
jurors during a time when the Court was in recess but before the 
natter had been submitted to the jury for decision. 
The motion is denied because plaintiff failed to raise the 
issue in a timely fashion. Failure to object on a timely basis 
constitutes a waiver of the claimed error. 
1994. 
yjuu*. 
vid L. Mower, Judge 
CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
On Janu^^%£L_i 1994 a copy of the above ORDER ON MOTION 
f^R f^ >0^ ---?fi^ fi^ 5;as sent to each of the following by the method 
indicated: J^ 1** 
FILE COPY 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, Case number 928600128, page -2-
flddressee Method (Mail, in Person, Fax) Addressee Method (fail, in Person, Fax) 
C*3 Mr. Robert H. Henderson CA^Qf Mr. Edward G. Wells 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
10 Exchange Place 11th 
Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
/ 
73 
Tab 4 
EDWARD T. WELLS 3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 800 232-8915 
•-• SE? 7 PF! U nr 05 
" I X • • -N — 
BY 
^xAiv^QOEPury 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as a 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SANPETE 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOREEN JOHNSON 
Civil No. 0920600128 
Assigned To: 
Honorable David L. Mower 
ooOoo 
ss 
) 
I, Doreen Johnson, having been duly sworn, depose and 
state as follows: 
1. I am the mother of Reynold Johnson, III. 
2. The facts stated herein are based upon my knowledge 
and personal observation. 
3. I was present in the courtroom on the first day of 
trial, the 5th day of August, 1993. During a recess, I observed 
the Defendant, Michael Coons, in the presence of the jury, approach 
at least two members of the jury and shake hands and engage them in 
conversation. 
4 . 1 was also present in the courtroom on the last day 
of trial, the 6th day of August, 1993. During the final recess of 
the trial, while the judge and the trial lav/yers were in chambers 
drafting jury instructions, I observed the Defendant, Michael 
Coons, engaging members of the jury in conversation. 
5. The Defendant spoke with at least two members of the 
jury in the presence of all of the other members of the jury. Mr. 
Coons and the jury members he was talking to were speaking of 
common friends and discussing their mission with the Latter Day 
Saints Church in Israel. 
6. I also observed the Defendants wife, Mrs. Coons, 
speaking with the members of the jury. 
7. Also discussed were other friends and family members 
of the Defendant's. 
is 6? day oJ DATED th f September. 1993 
'fT'Zrf?/* ./i(V?'?r<2r *7 
DOREEN JOHNSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO befor 
September, 1993. 
day of 
MY Commissip, 
V 
issipn E 
l* ml xpires: 
'OTARY PUBLIC 
esiding im/Sanpete County, 
State of #tah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
L1ESL H. D I U P £ « 
546 West 200 South 
Fountain Green. UT 84632 
My Commission Expires 
June 15th. 1997 
STATE OK UTAH 
EDWARD T. WELLS 3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 800 232-8915 
FILED 
SAHFE'E ""lU'--':-. 'I7.AU 
'do SEP 7 PF\ 4 04 
"v.v -ST :i-4 7 F -, •" ,;"Ti * v c : * 
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EY ^ J l ^ ^ ^ DEPUTY 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as a 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW BERRY 
Civil No. 0920600128 
Assigned To: 
Honorable David L. Mower 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
I, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., having been duly sworn, depose 
and state as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-captioned action 
having heretofor been appointed as conservator and guardian of the 
minor child, Reynold Q. Johnson, III, by the Honorable Don Vc 
Tibbs. 
2. The facts stated herein are based upon my knowledge 
and personal observation. 
3. I was present in the courtroom on the last day of 
trial, the 6th day of August, 1993. During the final recess of the 
trial, v/hile the judge and the trial lawyers were in chambers 
drafting jury instructions, I observed the Defendant, Michael 
Coons, engaging members of the jury in conversation. 
4. The Defendant spok£ with at least two members of the 
jury in the presence of all of the other members of the jury. Mr. 
Coons and the jury members he was talking to were speaking of 
common friends and discussing their mission v/ith the Latter Day 
Saints Church in Israel. 
5. Also discussed were other friends and family members 
of the Defendant's. 
DATED this //I d^y^pf SeffetemberJ 19 93 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me tl 
September, 1993. 
Mv>€pmniis3ion Expires: Residing 
State of Utah 
BLIC 
Sanpete County, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
LIESL H. DRAPE* 
546 West 200 South 
15} Fountain Green. UT 84632 1 
; wsm-uf/pf M y Co^frtssion Expires 
• V V ^ > V June 15th. 1997 
><• .•. \ S STATE OK UTA•« 
EDWARD T. WELLS 3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 800 232-8915 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as a 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SANPETE 
AFFIDAVIT OF LIESL H. DRAPER 
Civil No. 0920600128 
Assigned To: 
Honorable David L. Mower 
ooOoo 
: ss 
) 
I, Liesl H. Draper, having been duly sworn, depose and 
state as follows: 
1. I am the legal assistant for Andrew B. Berry, Jr Q, 
attorney at law. 
2. The facts stated herein are based upon my knowledge 
and personal observation. 
3. I was present in the courtroom on the last day of 
trial, the 6th day of August, 1993. During the final recess of the 
trial, while the judge and the trial lawyers were in chambers 
drafting jury instructions, I observed the Defendant, Michael 
Coons, engaging members of the jury in conversation. 
4. The Defendant spoke with at least two members of the 
jury in the presence of all of the other members of the jury- Mr-
Coons and the jury members he was talking to were speaking of 
common friends and discussing their mission with the Latter Day 
Saints Church in Israel. 
5. Also discussed were other friends and family members 
of the Defendant's. 
DATED this jT' day of &eptembe//*^L9 93. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7 ~ day of 
September, 1993. 
^ y ^ ^ ^ . 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Sanpete County, 
State of Utah 
Tab 5 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiffs, 
v s . 
C i v i l No. 0920600128 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Judge David Mower 
Defendant . 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
The plaintiff, by and through his guardian and by and 
through his counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through 
his counsel of record, hereby stipulate to try this case on 
liability only, submitting the case to the jury on a special 
verdict form which shall pose two questions: 
. i. Was Michael K. Coons negligent? (and if 
the answer is ffyes,f) 
2. Was the negligence of Michael K. Coons a 
proximate cause of the injuries of 
plaintiff?; 
and, in the event the jury answers yes to both questions, to 
settle the case for $100,000. The parties move the Court for an 
Order in accordance with this Stipulation. 
DATED this ,2-^cLay of June, 1993. 
ROBERT J & ASSOCIATES 
T. WEILS' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Henderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
- 2 -
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